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SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN LABOR LAW
DURING THE LAST HALF-CENTURY
Russell A. Smith*

I

is common knowledge that dramatic and almost revolutionary
developments have taken place in labor law since the turn of the
century. Indeed, "labor law" has only during this period achieved
the distinction of a recognized branch of the law. Concurrently, trade
uriions have experienced an amazing growth, as well as changes in
basic structure, and it may fairly be stated that the enlargement of the
pertinent body of law has both stimulated and been influenced by
the augmentation of union power. This article is intended as a survey
of significant developments in the law, not as a treatment of the
minutiae.
As the twentieth century dawned, trade union membership in this
country stood at approximately 790,000,1 which compares with a peak
membership of some 14,000,000 to 16,000,000 achieved by 1950.2
The American Federation of Labor, and constituent craft unions, with
a membership of about 625,000, were the dominant organizations in
1900. Other important unions, however, such as the railroad "Big
·Four," were also on the scene. These organizations had emerged out
of a vortex of nineteenth century uriion movements of variegated
pattern reaching back to the earliest stirrings of American industrial
development following the War of 1812. The intervening period had
witnessed the rise and decline of many types of labor organizations,
some feeble, some fairly potent, including those with such intriguing
names as the Order of the Knights of St. Crispin, the "Molly Maguires,"
and the Noble Order of the Knights of Labor.3
The worker organizations of the nineteenth century had not, on the
whole, found a friendly legal climate. Political democracy, with its
legal trappings, was accepted, though subjected to the severe strain
of racism, but "industrial democracy" was quite another matter. The
T

,. Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1 BUREAu oP WOR STATisncs, HANDBOOK OP LABOR STATisncs

139 (1950).
2Ibid.
3 There are many excellent historical treatments of the American trade union movement, including DAUGHERTY, woR PROBLEMS IN AM:smCAN hmusTRY, 5th ed., cc. XI
and XII (1948); DANKERT, CoNTllMPORARY UNIONISM IN THB UNITED STATES, cc. 2 and
3 (1948); BLOOM AND NoRTHRUP, EcoNoMics oP woR AND hmuSTRIAL RELATIONS,
Part II (1950); FoNBR, HISTORY OP THB LABOR MOVEMENT IN THB UNITED STATES (1947);
PERLMAN, HISTORY OP TRADE UNIONISM IN THB UNITED STATES (1937); PETERSON,
AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS (1945); and PETERSON, SURVEY op LABoR EcoNoMics, c. 17
(W47).
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economic philosophy of la{iisez-faire, strongly influenced by classical
wage theory, combined with an accommodating legal system to produce strong support for the managerial prerogative in its not unnatural
resistance to the incursions of organized labor. The result was that the
labor movement had to wage an uphill battle to attain acceptability and
legal status. Labor's objective was to obtain a voice in the determination
of working conditions; this was an invasion of management "rights" not
lightly to be countenanced.
Thus the initial attempts at effective labor organization and collective action during the first several decades of the last century were so
obnoxious according to the mores of the times that they were even
regarded as common law criminal conspiracies.4 Although the landmark opinion of Chief Judge Shaw of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Hunt weakened this line of attack, the doctrine was applied
as late as 1867.6 It made possible a dual legal appraisal of trade unions
and their activities. Both the means used or contemplated, and the
objectives sought, passed under judicial scrutiny under standards so
amorphous that the judges' own predilections could become the law
of the case and of the land.
In the latter part of the century the courts turned from the criminal
law to tort law as the principal means of controlling worker collective
action, although local statutes and ordinances were commonly invoked,
as today, to deal with disorderly conduct and kindred acts of violence.
This transition reflected not so much an increased legal acceptance of
labor organizations as the selection of a more effective remedy, for it
was the equity courts which stepped into the arena and made available
the speedy, flexible and potent weapon of the injunction, first used in a
labor case in this country in 1877.7 From this point on until the recent
era of legislative intervention the development of the law concerning
trade unionism was substantially the work of the equity judges, and
they found themselves equipped with a considerable assortment of
legal tools for the task. 8 Of these the most important by all odds was
the doctrine of civil conspiracy ·which, like its earlier counterpart of
the criminal law, permitted judgment to be passed both on ends sought
and means used or contemplated. Even the government, in the famous
4 The historically famous Cordwainer cases w~ the first in which the doctrine of criminal conspiracy was applied in this country, and began with Commonwealth v. Pullis (the
Philadelphia Cordwainer's Case), Philadelphia Mayor's Court, 1806 (Doc. HIST. OF AM.
IND. Soc., vol. 3, p. 60). See SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABoa LAW, c. II (1950).
5 4 Mete. 111, 38 Am. Dec. 346 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1842).
6 State v. Donaldson, 32 N.J.L. 151 (1867).
7 LANDIS AND MANOFF, CAsEs ON LABoa LAw, 2d ed., 38, 39 (1942).
8 See SMITH, LABOR LAw 78 and 79 (1950) for a catalog of typically used legal doctrines.
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Debs case,9 invoked the strong arm of the chancellor to deal with the
Pullman strike in 1894.
It is interesting to note that the courts had to grapple with the
union "problem" during the nineteenth century unaided by legislative
guidance: Perhaps this means that the legislatures on the whole were
satisfied with the results of judicial intervention, but it also attests to
a lack of political power or interest, or both, on the part of the unions.
Traditionally, the unions of this country have not sought political
solutions of their problems. Only in the limited areas of working
hours, especially for women, and the employment of child labor, was
there any substantial legislative action.

The Flowering of "Rule by Injunction"
Th~ first three decades of the twentieth century witnessed the
full realization of the potentialities of the labor injunction. The "right
to strike" peacefully and for a proper purpose was increasingly conceded,
hut, on the ground of impropriety of purpose, injunctions frequently
issued against strikes having organizational or union security objectives,
· or aimed at various kinds of "interference" with the management
function, or to force changes in conditions established by a collective
agreement. The "yellow dog contract" appeared on the scene as a
means of obstructing the organizational efforts of unions, and in 1917
received the blessing of the Supreme Court in the famous Hitchman
case.10 Some courts declared against picketing in any form, considering
it inherently coercive and therefore illegal; most courts came to regard
it as lawful if primary and peaceful, hut were astute to detect in it
elements of coercion. The involvement of third parties in a labor
dispute through the use of secondary picketing and strike action
( commonly termed the "boycott") fared the least well.
The impact of the injunction was severe, not only because the
courts evolved a complex body of substantive dogma relating to the
use of collective action, but also because injunction procedure lacked
safeguards designed to insure a fair treatment of the union defendants.
Equity jurisdiction, which on the basis of historical principle should
have been invoked only sparingly and after a full exploration of its
relative utility and propriety, was assumed almost without question, as if
the labor dispute was the peculiar bailiwick of the chancellor. With the
assumption of jurisdiction went the procedural techniques especially suit9In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 15 S.Ct. 900 (1895).
lOHitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 38 S.Ct. 65 (1917).

1268

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 50

able and desirable, and indeed the peculiar virtue, of the equity courts
in other contexts but ill adapted to the dynamics of the labor relations
controversy. Thus, there was common use of the ex parte order issued
on plaintiff's affidavit (or verified complaint) at the very moment
when the timing of the collective action by the union was a paramount
element in its strategy; supporting affidavits came to have a stereotyped
form, were often made by espionage agents and other persons of dubious
credibility, and counter-affidavits by the defendants frequently were of
no avail; unions were commonly held accountable for the acts of
individuals (as on the picket line) without inquiry into such matters
as authorization, ratification or condonation; decrees were generally
written broadly, verbosely, legalistically, and with little concern for
the preservation of defendants' rights or for the problem of clear communication. These and other aspects of the labor injunction were the
subject of sharp criticism by Judge Amidon of the federal bench in
1923,11 but the instances of such judicial criticism were exceedingly
rare.
The Gradual Achievement of Status by Labor Organizations
The liberal use of the injunctiQn as a means of control of union
action was at the same time accompanied by a gradual, though perhaps
begrudging, recognition of the legal acceptability and even of the social
desirability of labor organizations. The courts on the whole applied
strict standards of appraisal of methods used and, to some degree, of
particular objectives sought, but the nineteenth century skepticism
of the basic needs, interests, and fundamental aims of worker organizations fell gradually before the onslaught of time.
Even before the tum of the century Judge Holmes, while sitting
on the Massachusetts bench, had solicited his brethren to be wary of
facile assumptions with respect to the propriety of worker organization.
In V egelalin 11. Gu-ntner, he said: 12
". . . it is plain from the slightest consideration of practical
affairs, or the most superficial reading of industrial history, that
free competition means combination, and that the organization of
the world, now going on so fast, means an ever increasing might
and scope of combination. It seems to me futile to set our faces
against this tendency. Whether beneficial on the whole, as I think
it, or detrimental, it is inevitable, unless the fundamental axioms
11 Great Northern Railway Co. v. Brosseau, (D.C.
12 167 Mass. 92 at 108, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).

N.D. 1923) 286 F. 414.
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of society, and even the fundamental conditions of life, are to be
changed.
"One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is
that between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his
services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital, to
get his services for the least possible return. CQmbination on the
one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other is the
necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried
_on in a fair and equal way."
In 1902 Holmes reiterated his faith in the social validity of worker
collaboration when, again in dissent, he urged in Plant v. W oods1 8
that collective action for organizational purposes should not be condemned. Rejecting the attempted differentiation between attempts
immediately to improve working conditions and attempts to organize,
he said: "I think that unity of organization is necessary to make the
contest of labor effectual, and that societies of laborers lawfully may
employ in their preparation the means which they might use in the
final contest."14 These views he asserted despite the fact that, as
an economic classicist, he believed that unions could not achieve
fundamental financial gains for the workers as a whole.111
It is interesting in this connection to note that even before these
''liberal" expressions by Holmes, Judge Macomber of the New York
Supreme Court in 1880 had expressed the view that the organization
of workers. was the necessary antidote to the growing power of
capitalism.16 He thought that the "wisest rule of political economy
would demand that there should be no legislation upon this subject
1s 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
H Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492 at
15 "Although this is not the place for

505, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
extended economic discussions, and although the
law may not always reach ultimate economic conceptions, I think it well to add that I cherish
no illusions as to the meaning and effect of strikes. While I think the strike a lawful instrument in the universal struggle of life, I think it pure phantasy to suppose that there is a
body of capital of which labor as a whole secures a larger share by that means. The animal
product, subject to an infinitesimal deduction for the luxuries of the few, is directed to
consumption by the multitude, and is consumed by the multitude, always. Organization ana
strikes may get a larger share for the members of an organization, but, if they do, they get
it at the expense of the less organized and less powerful portion of the laboring mass. They
do not create something out of nothing. It is only by divesting our minds of questions of
ownership and other machinery of distribution, and by looking solely at the question of
consumption-asking ourselves what is the annual product, who· consumes it, and what
changes would or could we make-that we can keep in the world of realities. But, subject
to the qualifications which I have expressed, I think it lawful for a body of workmen to
try by combination to get more than they are now getting, although they do it at the expense
of their fellows, and to that end to strengthen their union by the boycott and the strike."
Holmes, J., in Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492 at 505, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
16 The Johnson Harvester Company v. Meinhart, 60 How. Pr. 168 (1880).
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beyond preserving both employer and employed against violence and
breaches of the peace, or acts in the nature of trespass, which have a
tendency to bring about breaches of the peace," and by the same token
he considered that courts should not go beyond preservation of the
peace and the establishing of "responsibility for any acts which immediately and in a legal sense affect the rights of either [employers
or employed]."11 Had this view been taken by the courts as a whole,
the shape of the law with respect to collective action would have been
vastly different.
The views of Macomber did not prevail. The courts assumed
the responsibility of passing on union objectives and conduct by
the use of standards which they themselves in substantial part had
to devise from whole cloth. Nevertheless, the basic notion that workers
have a legitimate interest in organizing for the purpose of improving
~eir lot by collective action came to be accepted, classical economics
to the contrary notwithstanding. This principle was codified as part
of the federal anti-trust legislation in 1914 with the statement, in
section 6 of the Clayton Act, that "the labor of a human being is not
a commodity or article of commerce,"18 and Chief Justice Taft elaborated the point in his celebrated opinion in the Tri-City Central Trad.es
Council case in 1921 :19
"... Labor unions are recognized by the Clayton Act as legal
when instituted for mutual help and lawfully carrying out their
legitimate objects. They have long been thus recognized by the
courts. They were organized out of the necessities of the situation. A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer.
He was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the employer refused to pay him
the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave
the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was
essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their
employer. They united to exert influence upon him and to leave
him in a body in order by this inconvenience to induce him to
make better terms with them. They were withholding their labor
of economic value to make him pay what they thought it was
worth. The right to combine for such a lawful purpose has in
many years not been denied by any court. The strike became a
lawful instrum~nt in a lawful economic struggle or competition
17Jd. at 176, 178.
1s 38 Stat. L. 731, 15 U.S.C. (1946) §17.
19 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 at
at 209, 42 S.Ct. 72 (1921).

1952]

1271

between employer and eniployees as to the _share or division ~
tween them of th~joint product of _labor and capital.•••"
This affirmation of the rightful place of labor organizations in
modem economic capitalist society· amply attests to the resilience of
the common law. Perhaps the judges moved too slowly in this direction;
perhaps, as Professor Gregory argues, they should never have assumed
the prerogative of basic policy-making in passing on the legality of
union conduct;20 no doubt many of them gave only lip service to the
propositions announced by Chief Justice Taft, and earlier by Holmes,
while finding ready pretexts for condemning specific union conduct.
Nevertheless, the judicial record of the early decades of the present
century is not wholly bad, even from the point of view of the protagonist of organized labor. "Rule by injunction" we had, but unions
were finding their place even on the legal horizon.

Legislative Curbs on the Use of t!ie Labor Injunction
As early as 1903 there began a legislative movement to curb the
extensive use and correct the procedural defects of the labor injunction.
This effort, which originated in the states and in 1914 spread to the Congress with the enactment of the Clayton Act, has been described vividly
in the notable work of Frankfurter and Greene.21 An understandable
judicial animadversion to these intrusions perhaps accounts in part for
the fact that the earlier statutes, particularly, suffered ;i. substantial
emasculation as well as constitutional obstacles at the hands of the
courts. On both points the Supreme Court, itself, led the way, with
its celebrated decisions in Truax v. Corrigan,22 which held invalid the
~ n a act of 1913, and the Duplex Printing Press Co.28 and Bedford
Cut Stone cases,24 which placed a narrowly restrictive construction
upon the anti-injunction provisions of the Clayton Act.
A number of states followed the example of Congress and enacted
legislation modeled more or less on section 20 of the Clayton Act,
although the reform movement was dealt a severe blow by the cited
decisions of the Supreme Court. Congress, itself, was not moved to
take further action until 1932, when the Norris-LaGuardia Act:25 was
20 GREGORY, LABon AND nm LAw, rev. ed. (1949).
21 TRB LABon INJUNCTlON (1930). See also Smith

and DeLancey, ''The State Legislatures and Unionism," 38 MICH, L. RBv. 987 at 1013 ff. (1940).
22 257 U.S. 312, 42 S.Ct. 124 (1921).
2s Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S.Ct. 172 (1921).
24 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assn., 274 U.S. 37, 47 S.Ct.
522 (1927).
2547 Stat. L. 70, 29 U.S.C. (1946) §§101-115.
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passed following the earnest prodding of able cntics of the labor
injunction led by Frankfurter and Greene. This statute was artfully
written so as to obviate, if possible, a repetition of the earlier experience
under the Clayton Act. The act imposed extensive restrictions on the
federal judiciary in terms both of substance and ·procedure, and was in
turn followed by a wave of similar state legislation.
The Norris Act is noteworthy not only for its specific limitations on
the courts, but also for its broad declaration of public policy in favor
of the free association of workers for purposes of collective bargaining.
The helplessness of the individual employee in dealing with his employer "under prevailing economic conditions" was recognized, and
there wa~ affirmed the necessity of "full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives . . . free from the
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers. . . ."26 This policy
was specifically implemented only by making "yellow-dog" contracts
·unenforceable in the federal courts, and by limiting the availability of
the federal court injunction, but it was, nevertheless, in many respects
an epochal and portentous pronouncement.
Federal Railway Labor Relations Legislation

The evolution of federal labor policy during the first three decades
of the present century is shown not only by the anti-injunction statutes,
but also by . the history of federal railway labor legislation. This
began even before 1900 with the Arbitration Act of 188827 and culminated with the Railway Labor Act of 1926 which, as amended, is
the law today .28 The Railway Labor Act, often referred to as a "model"
labor relations law, was the product of a great deal of earlier legislative
experimentation, and it is interesting to note that, as enacted in 1926,
it represented the joint thinking of railway employers and unions
themselves. Like the later Norris Act, it posited the desirability of
free employee association, but for the first time in federal legislative
history it wrote into law broad definitive proscriptions of employer
· interference with this "right" of self-organization as well as an obligation to bargain collectively. In addition, it recognized and gave attention
to the problems of dispute settlement by creating special mediation
machinery, encouraging resort to arbitration, and providing techniques
for the handling of serious "emergency" strikes.
26 Section 2.
21 25 Stat. L.

501.
2845 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) c. 8. For an account of the various statutes see SMITH,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 84-90 (1950).
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This is not the occasion for a critical appraisal of the act, though
it may be noted that there is considerably less enthusiasm for it now
than formerly. 29 The statute does represent a significant chapter in the
development of American labor law; the industries ( which now
include interstate air transport) to which it applies are obviously important; moreover experience under it adds measurably to the cumulative total and thus contributes. toward an enlightened approach to the
difficult problem of lawmaking in this area.

The National Labor Rela~ions Act of 1935
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the "Wagner Act")30
probably ranks as the most important event of the past fifty years in
the development of American labor relations law. It set national policy
firmly and, I believe irretrievably, in favor of the right of self-organization. It interred, probably for good, the doctrine of criminal and civil
conspiracy as applied to the organization of workers per se. It did
not originate the notion that the right of self-organization should be
implemented by legally enforceable duties upon employers, for this
had already been accomplished for the railroads and airlines by the
Railway Labor Act. But it did, for the first time, state these obligations in an orderly code of "unfair labor practices," and, for the first
time, there was created a special governmental administrative agency
charged with the enforcement of this code as a matter of public responsibility and not merely of private right.
The act of 1935 was designed to do more than declare the right
of self-organization. Pre-enactment history, the language of the act,
and the militancy shown in its administration, especially during the
first several years of its life, all show that it was intended in fact to
promote the rapid unionization of American industry. Section l
("Findings and Policy") reveals quite clearly the underlying philosophy. Framed for the immediate purpose of helping to sustain the
legislation against the inevitable assault upon it on constitutional
grounds, this section also reveals the determination of the Roosevelt
administration to espouse the cause of unionism as a matter of considered social, economic, and perhaps political, policy. The stamping
out of employer obstructionism was to remove one source of industrial
strife which burdened interstate commerce, and on this point the
framers cited prior supporting "experience," doubtless referring to
29 See, for example, Northrup, "The Railway Labor Act and Railway Labor Disputes
in Wartime," 36 AM. Ee. REv. 324 (1946).
ao 49 Stat. L. 449.
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the Railway Labor Act. The "inequality of bargaining power" between
employers and employees lacking full freedom of association was held
to "aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates
and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preven~g
the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions ...."
The clear implication of this declaration was that workers should seize
their freedom and organize, since only by means of unionization could
this economic objective be realized, and there was clearly implicit a
positive rejection of the theory that unionism and collective bargaining
have little or no economic validity. Unionization was not merely to be
countenanced and tolerated on the grounds earlier advanced by Holmes
and Chief Justice Taft, in recognition of the natural desire of the
individual worker to attempt to improve his bargaining position vis-a-vis
his employer; tnis legitimate private interest of the worker was fortified
by a new declaration of the existence of a broad public interest in the
·matter premised on a new economic faith.
The important objectives of the act could not have been realized
if the constitutional issues which it raised had not been decided in
favor of its validity, so. the Supreme Court's decisions on these matters
must be put down as a tremendously significant contribution of the last
half-century to labor and constitutional law. The Jones & Laughlin
and associated cases, decided in April 1937,31 "overruled" a substantial
segment of the American bar in upholding the statute.32 The rationale
of the earlier Adair3 and Coppage34 cases was clearly, although not
expressly, repudiated with the Court's rejection of the "due process"
attack upon the act, and these and later decisions gave almost unlimited
jurisdiction to the National Labor Relations Board under the commerce
power.
With the aid of the powerful policy pronouncement contained in
the NLRA, given full legal effectiveness by the Supreme Court, and
assisted by a zealous and almost crusading enforcement of the act by
the NLRB, it is not surprising tliat the labor movement very shortly
made the greatest membership gains in its history.35 To this end the
appearance on the scene of the CIO, with its preoccupation with the
81 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615; NLRB v. Freuhauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 S.Ct. 642; NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Iy'Iarks Clothing
Co., 301 U.S. 58, 57 S.Ct. 645; Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650; and
Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142, 57 S.Ct. 648.
32 I refer particularly to the "Report on the Constitutionality of the National Labor
Relations Act" issued in September 1935, by the National Lawyers Committee of the "American Liberty League," signed by many eminent members of the bar.
33 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 16, 28 S.Ct. 277 (1908).
34 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 S.Ct. 240 (1915).
35 Total union membership rose from approximately 3,700,000 in 1935 to almost
9,000,000 in 1940. BLS, HANDBOOK 01' LABOR STATISTICS 139 (1950).
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organization of the unskilled workers, was particularly adventitious.
After a few hectic years during which powerful employers in the steel,
automotive, and other mass production industries made their last stand,
the battle for organization and collective bargaining rights in the basic
industries was substantially won by the unions, and labor-management
relations entered upon a new phase.
Introduction of Legislative Employment Standards
During the 'thirties the new national labor policy was manifested
jn legislation dealing directly with employment standards, as well as
·in the promotion of unionization and collective bargaining. Most
important were the Social Security Act of 193536 and the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.37 These enactments were earnestly supported
by the unions, a fact which shows that the unions would not thenceforth
be content to rely exclusively on collective bargaining as a means of
improving the worker's lot. The problems of unemployment and superannuation were to be solved or at least mitigated by direct legislative
action.
The social security legislation, while "new deal" in origin, must
now be regarded as expressing a fundamental and permanent national
policy. The program is familiar to all and need not be detailed here,
except to note that it provides unemployment insurance, old-age and
survivors' insurance, old-age assistance, and various other welfare
benefits. From the point of view of organized labor the most important
of these are the unemployment and old-age insurance features. These,
in recent years, have become the springboard from which the unions
have launched a generally successful campaign for supplementation
through collective bargaining.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 contained minimum wage,
overtime premium pay, and child labor provisions, of which the first
two were the most significant to the unions. Important judicial decisions under the act, such as those dealing with the "portal to portal''
pay question,88 and the meaning of the phrase "regular rate of pay"
for overtime pay purposes,89 had important repercussions on collective
ae 49 Stat. L. 620, 42 U.S.C. (1946) §§301-302.
s1 52 Stat. L. 1060.
SB Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 64
S.Ct. 698 (1944); and Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 66 S.Ct. 1187
(1946).
39149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199, 67 S.Ct. 1178 (194:7); Walling
v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 65 S.Ct. 11 (1944); Overnight Motor Transportation Co., Inc. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 62 S.Ct. 1216 (1942); Walling v. Belo Corp., 316
U._S. 624, 62 S.Ct. 1223 (1942); and Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446,
68 S.Ct. 1186 (1948).
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bargaining as well as in the administration of the act, which led ultimately to the enactment of the Portal to Portal Act of 194740 and the
Fair Labor Standards Amendments· of 1949.41 These statutes now
constitute a complex part of the labor law structure of the country. The
prime motivation for the original act was the depression of the early
'thirties. Purchasing power of the worker was to be maintained by
-means of the device of the minimum wage, and increased employment
was to be induced by discouraging the use of the long workweek and
by eliminating the employment of child labor. The continuance of the
statutory standards, however, during the periods of full employment of
World War II and thereafter clearly shows that by general consent
the original rationale has been supplanted. The permanence of this
legislation, in terms of general principle, laying aside details, is now
unquestioned, without regard to the economic state of the nation.
The Supreme Court and Collective Action

Returning now to the subject of labor law as it concerns unionmanagement relations, note must be taken of certain significant contributions made by the Supreme Court during the past two decades in
relation to the legal status of union collective action. The rapid growth
of the unions, under the beneficent influence of the Norris Act
of 1932 and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, was bound to
enlarge the area and increase the incidence of union strike, picketing,
and boycott action, and, indeed, the act of 1935 purported to assure to
employees the right "to engage in concerted activities, for the p~rpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."42 It was
inevitable that the Court should ultimately face questions relating tq
the extent of the union privilege to employ these coercive measures.
Naturally enough, the question first posed concerned the extent pf
the rights granted by the NLRA. In the MacKay Radio case,43
decided in 1938, it was made clear that the peaceful economic strike
was a protected form of concerted action, but in the Fansteel case,114
decided a year later, the Court, in one of its few basic disagreements
with the policies of the NLRB, held that workers who engaged in a
"sit-down" strike forfeited their right to be protected against employer
retaliation. In the same year it was held in the Sands case45 that a
40 61 Stat. L. 84, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §§251-262.
4163 Stat. L.-910, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §§201-261.
42 Section 7 of the act.
43 NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 S.Ct. 904 (1938).
44 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, 306 U.S. 240, 59 S.Ct. 490 (1939).
45 NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 59 S.Ct. 508 (1939).
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strike in repudiation of a collective agreement similarly removed the
strikers from the protection of the act. The latter two cases forced the
adoption of the broad principle that when serious misconduct attended
the use of concerted action, the workers involved could be dealt with
by the employer without regard to his normal obligations under the
statute. Thus, the statutory protection of concerted action was not
to be given full literal effect. The interesting result was that a law
which on its face was not at all concerned with the regulation of union
and employee conduct became the basis for indirect sanctions against
misconduct. It became necessary for the NLRB and the courts to
grope for appropriate standards of misconduct, which they, like the
common law and equity courts, had to supply out of their own experience and precepts, unaided by legislative guidance. History appears to
have repeated itself.
This incursion into the field of union collective action was accompanied by judicial action on two additional fronts, but with very
different implications for organized labor. In 1940 the Court held in
the Thornhill46 and Carlson47 cases that peaceful picketing was a
constitutionally protected form of "free speech," and in the Hutcheson
case48 that union action which was non-enjoinable under section 20 of
the Clayton Act, read in conjunction with the Norris Act, could not
be made the basis for prosecution under the Sherman Act. These were
momentous decisions. The first two gave the Court a broad supervisory
control over the injunctive activities, insofar as picketing was concerned, of all the courts in the land. The third substantially ended the
use of the federal anti-trust laws as an instrument of union regulation,
for it became apparent a few years later in the Allen Bradley case49 that
only where there is union-employer collaboration to protect labor and
product markets against outside competition will there still be union
liability under the Sherman Act.
The ink was hardly dry on the picketing cases before the Court
began a series of qualifying decisions which, as of today, have robbed
Thornhill and Carlson of most of their vitality.50 To the student of
46 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
47 Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 746 (1940).
48 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 61 S.Ct. 463 (1941).
49 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Intl. Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers,
325 U.S. 797, 65 S.Ct. 1533 (1945).
50 Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowrnoor Dairies, Inc.,
312 U.S. 287, 61 S.Ct. 552 (1941); Carpenter and Joiners Union of America, Local No.
213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct. 807 (1942); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684 (1949); Building Service Employees International Union
v.~Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 'JO S.Ct. 784 (1950); Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v.
Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 70 S.Ct. 773 (1950); and Hughes v. Superior Court of California,
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labor law the most interesting aspect of these cases is that the Court

felt constrained, as it had in respect to the problem of defining protected concerted action under the NLRA, to permit legislative and
judicial appraisal of the kind of picketing employed and of the object for
which it was employed. The decision in the Meadowmoor case51
opened the door to the sweeping injunction in any case in which the
trial court could with reason conclude, in the language of Justice
Frankfurter, "... that the momentum of fear generated by past violence
would survive even though future picketing might be wholly peaceful."
In Ritter,5 2 then in Giboney,53 and finally in relation to the "secondary
boycott" provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act,5 4 the use of picketing
as a means of assisting or setting in motion secondary economic pressure
was released from constitutional immunity. In the Gazzam, Hanke
and Hughes decisions55 of 1950 state authority to proscribe picketing
,for ends reasonably deemed improper was upheld. It is thus apparent
that something like the much maligned "ends-means" test of the common law became the rationale for a strategic retreat by the Court from
its original constitutional position with respect to picketing. Meanwhile,
the Court had steadfastly refused to extend the shelter of the Constitution to strike action, although the trade unionist would certainly
consider the "right to strike" even more basic than the "right to
picket."56
The Court's high-level supervention with respect to picketing
no doubt served the desirable end of forcing a greater degree of state
court restraint in the use of the labor injunction, and of inducing
a closer analysis generally of the legitimate interests of the unions
in their resort to collective action. Even the exposition of constitutional
doctrine in the sanctum-of the Supreme Court building does not wholly
339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718 (1950). Cf. Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802
v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, ·62 S.Ct. 816 (1942); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568
(1941); and Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 64 S.Ct. 126 (1943).
51 Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
312 U.S. 287 at 294, 61 S.Ct. 552 (1941).
52 Carpenter and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S.
722, 62 S.Ct. 807 (1942).
53 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684 (1949).
54 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, AFL v. NLRB, 341 U.S.
694, 71 S.Ct. 954 (1951).
55 Building Service Employees International Union v. Gazzara, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc v. Hanke, and Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S.
532, 70 S.Ct. 784 (1950).
56 See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 47 S.Ct. 86 (1926); Lincoln Federal Labor
Union No. 19129, AFL v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Company, 335 U.S. 525, 69
S.Ct. 251 (1949); and International Union, UAWA-AFL v. Wisconsin Employment Rela•
tions Board, 336. U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949).
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escape the influence of current opinion, and it is to be recalled that
by 1940, when the first picketing cases were considered, the proclaiming
of the ''bill of rights" of labor, as declared in the Wagner Act, was at
its zenith. However, the Court's present position, which permits the
regulation of picketing within fairly wide limits, was inevitable unless
the Court was prepared to place all forms of peaceful union collective
action beyond legislative and judicial controi, a situation which, as
the history of the post-war "national emergency" strike problem amply
shows, would be intolerable. Even the best friends of the labor movement must surely agree that, in the long, run, it is wise policy to equate
the strike, boycott and picketing with otlier forms of collective economic
pressure insofar as constitutional issues are concerned.

The War Labor Policy: Tri-Partitism
Organized labor played a role during World War II consonant with
its newly attained stature. President Roosevelt won a no-strike pledge
from the national unions, and assured them that the statutory gains
represented by the Fair Labor Standards Act and the National Labor
Relations Act would be safeguarded. Labor leaders occupied prominent
positions in important war agencies, such as the Advisory Commission
to the Council of National Defense, the Office of Production Management, the War Production Board, the War ·Manpower Commission,
and the Defense Advisory Commission. Of greater pertinence to our
present theme, however, was the emergency War Labor Board machinery designed to prevent runaway inflation and to assure that
labor disputes should not interrupt production of essential goods. In
-this mechanism tri-partitism was a feature of paramount importance.
The principle of equal representation of public, labor and management
was not novel-indeed, it had been used in World War I-but the
responsibilities and powers of War Labor Board II were much greater
than those of War Labor Board 1.57
The Boarcl had to function for a time without benefit of statutory
sanction or guidance, under powers conferred upon it by executive
order, and, as to its dispute function, relying principally on the original
"no strike" pledge resulting from the labor and industry conference
convened by.the President in December 1941. Even after the enact57For a full and authoritative documentation of the work of War Labor Board II
see the three volume publication by the U.S. Department of Labor entitled THE TElWINAneN REPORT OF THE NAnONAL WAR L.uion BoARD (1945).
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ment of the Stabilization Act of 194258 and the War Labor Disputes
Act of 1943,59 the Bqard continued to be the chief policy-maker in the
determination of principles of wage stabilization and dispute settlement.
The effectiveness of its program rested primarily on the cooperation of
management and labor and this cooperation was due in large part to
the fact that there was joint participation in making policy.
The forging of decisions in the tough crucible of tri-partitism meant
some degree of compromise with abstract principle, some inconsistency,
and a good deal of uncertainty, and it meant that the term "wage stabilization" signified something other than "wage freeze." All of this
was probably necessary, in view of the powerful bargaining position
of the labor unions in industry and, without any intention of being
invidious, their political influence with the administration. The
product was an amalgam compounded from the elements of two policies,
_one opposing wage increases, as part of the economics of counterinflation, and the other favoring a preservation of the principles of
collective bargaining. The resulting alloy naturally would not have
met the most rigid specifications for a solid anti-inflationary structure,
but it was on the whole adequate to support the requirements of the
total job which had to be done.
The procedures used and principles developed during this emergency period deserve mention in a chronicle of the significant labor law
developments of the past fifty years in view of their obvious importance
in relation to the crucial issues of the war, and also because of their
enduring effects. Recent events have forced us once again to resort to
"emergency" economic controls, and once again we have adopted a
tri-partite procedure for handling the problems of wage stabilization,
and, in critical cases, of dispute settlement. The present Wage Stabilization Board naturally, to some extent, looks to the policies developed
by the wartime Board as an important body of instructive experience
in developing its own program, although its problems in many respects
are different and require different s_olutions. The ''hold the line" cost
of living formula ("Little Steel") of the War Labor Board has evolved
into a firm policy of the present Board approving cost of living wage
adjustments,60 and the "inequality" doctrines of the earlier Board have
their counter-parts in the inter-plant and intra-plant inequity regulations of the present board.61
Stat. L. 765.
Stat. L. 163.
tiOWage Stabilization Board General Wage Regulation 8.
61 Wage Stabilization Board General Wage Regulations 17 and 18.
58 56
59 57
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Even without the intervention of another controlled economy, the
wage adjustment and dispute settlement policies of the War Labor
Board would have had enduring effects, for they profoundly influenced
and affected the content of collective bargaining agreements and management and union thinking. Witness, for example, the lasting effects of
the Board's "maintenance of membership" policy on the issue of union
security, its vacation and holiday pay edicts, and its position favoring
the inclusion of arbitration as the terminal step in contract grievance
procedure. In the light of post-war experience, it is evident that on the
whole the gains in contract terms achieved by the unions during the
war pursuant to Board order were not lost with the return of free collective bargaining. Instead, they have been absorbed and have tended,
like other contract terms, to become the base for further bargaining
demands. This natural evolution from directive to contract norm to
further bargaining pressure means that governmental intervention in
dispute settlement has most important implications.

Post-War Reaction:

The Ta~-Hartley Act

The decade from 1935 to 1945 saw a tremendous expansion of
trade union power under the stimulus, £.rst, of the pro-union NLRA
of 1935, and, second, of the favorable labor climate of World War ll. 62
The strategic position of the unions was such, especially in the basic
industries, that, but for their cbmmendable and patriotic exercise of
self-restraint, they could have forced upon the employers of the country
much greater bargaining gains than were actually realized through the
processes of the War Labor Board. With the coming of V-J Day, however, the need for self-restraint was reduced, while the areas of labormanagement disagreement increased sharply with the movement toward
reconversion to a peacetime economy. The result was a record number
of work stoppages of serious magnitude during 1946,63 and a succession
of bargaining crises while the nation groped toward a post-war wage
policy.
Even before the war there had been substantial pressure for a revision of the national labor laws so as to make them less partisan, and
the post-war strike wave heightened public interest in the matter of
62 Expressed in terms of membership figures alone, which do not by any means accurately measure the actual increase in power and position, total membership rose from approximately 3,700,000 in 1935 to approximately 15,000,000 in 1945. BLS, HANDBOOK OF
LuioR STATISTICS 139 (1950).
63 Man days lost through strikes rose to 38,025,000 in 1945 and 116,000,000 in 1946.
Set! 66 MoNTHLY Lui. REv. 62 (1948).
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statutory changes, especially to take account of the growing problem
of basic collective bargaining disputes. Scores of proposals of every
conceivable variety for new federal legislation were made in and out
of Congress. At length, in the Eightieth Congress, after a Republican
political resurgency had re-established conservative strength, the LaborManagement Relations Acf of 1947 (the "Taft-Hartley Act")64 was
enacted over Presidential veto. Union leaders denounced the act as
viciously anti-union, and vowed that it would have a short and ignoble
life. Their maledictions have continued, though at a notably reduced
volume, but to date their prophecies of the early demise of the act have
remained unfulfilled. It may well be that the act of 1947, with some
amendments and supplementation, will survive as a permanent part of
our structure of labor law. In any case, it has already marked a new
phase in the legal approach to labor relations problems.
. The major features of the law are familiar and need not be re.counted here. Its basic premise is that management-union-employee
relations, like other areas of human relations, can and should be subjected to legal rules, and it more closely approaches in character an overall labor relations code than any other American statute to date. Like
. the act of 1935, it deals with employer anti-unionism, and provides
principles and procedures for the settlement of representation questions, but with these matters the resemblance ends. Problems of collective bargaining received attention in the act of 193 5 only by imposing
upon employers the obligation to bargain with properly qualified
unions, whereas the act of 1947 imposes a reciprocal obligation upon
unions, stipulates minimum procedural requirements which bargainers- must meet in negotiating contract changes, creates special mediation.
machinery, provides for special treatment of the emergency-strike problem (using the techniques of fact-finding and injunction), and even,
to a limited degree, imposes limitations on the content of collective
agreements with its prohibition of the closed sh9p, its qualifications
on the union shop privilege, and its regulations of the check-off and
employer contributions to union welfare funds. The act of 1935 was
silent as to the problem of union and employee misconduct, while the
act of 1947 includes, as its most important single addition, a code of
union unfair labor practices. The act of 1935 omitted entirely any
reference to the institutional problems of unionism (membership
regulations, powers and duties of officers, relations between parent and
local unions, control of union funds, etc.), while the act of 1947 pays at
64

61 Stat. L. 136, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §§141-197.
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least limited attention to some of these. The one major category of
problems neglected by both laws, but, oddly enough, given extensive
treatment by the Railway Labor Act through the Adjustment Board
procedure, is the interpretation and application of collective agreements.
Orie very interesting, and perhaps unexpected, legal consequence
of the act of 1947 has been its devastating impact on state labor relations laws. In a series of cases resting on the postulates of the preLMRA decisions in Hill v. Florida65 and Bethlehem Steel Company v.
New York State LRB/36 the Supreme Court has held in effect that the
statute suspends most of the labor relations law of the states, at least
where legislatively declared, msofar as it may be applicable to employers and unions subject to the federal act, and this is most of them. The
Court has specifically held that, as to such parties, (I) state labor relations law proscriptions of employer unfair labor practices, of the
same tenor as those contained in the NLRA, may not be enforced,61
(2) representation questions may not be decided under state law,68
(3) strike notice and referendum provisions of state law may not be
applied,69 and ( 4) even state statutes providing for compulsory arbitration of public utility labor disputes, and suspending the right to
strike in respect thereto, are superseded. 10 Only two decisions of the
Court look in the other direction. In one of these the right of Wisconsin to regulate and limit irregular strike action (in this instance, the
unannounced "quickie" strike) was upheld,u but the authority of this
decision is subject to some question in the light of the decisions just
noted, all of which came later. In the other, it was held that the states
are free to impose more severe limitations on the union shop privilege
than are prescribed by the NLRA,12 but on this point the act, itself,
is quite clear. In the light of these cases an increasingly common state
court reaction to employer as well as to state labor board petitions to
enjoin union collective action is dismissal based upon the doctrine of
supersedure of state authority. Whether the doctrine has or has not
been correctly applied, and whether or not it represents sound policy,
BIS 325

U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373 (1945).
330 U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026 (1947).
6TPlankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin ERB, 338 U.S. 953, 70 S.Ct. 491 (1950).
es LaCrosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin ERB, 336 U.S. 18, 69 S.Ct. 379 (1949).
69 Intl. Union, UAW-CIO v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 70 S.Ct. 781 (1950).
TO Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Electric Ry. 8c Motor Coach Employees of Amer., Div.
998 v. Wisconsin ERB, 340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 359 (1951); and United Gas, Coke 8c
Chemical Workers of Amer., CIO et al. v. Wisconsin ERB, 340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 359
(1951).
u Intl. Union, UAW-AFL v. Wisconsin ERB, 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949).
12 Algoma Plywood 8c Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin ERB, 336 U.S. 301, 69 S.Ct. 584
(W49).
66
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are matters of serious discussion. 73 In any case, if it is to be applied as
broadly as is indicated by the current trend, the states will be substantially eliminated from the policy-making function in labor relations
matters, and the NLRB, on the other hand, will have a mountainous
burden of work, probably beyond its capacities, as the sole arbiter in
areas of regulation covered by the LMRA.
Whatever else may be said about the Taft-Hartley Act, it is an interesting adventure in the area of pervasive regulation, which cannot,
as yet, be fully evaluated. One might suppose that it would tend to
decelerate the pace of union organization by emphasizing the right of
workers to abstain and encouraging freer use by employers of counter
propaganda; yet the statistical record to date seems to be otherwise.74
Doubtless it has to some extent added strength to the bargaining position of employers, for every change in legal rules relating to the use
.of collective action necessarily affects the relative bargaining positions
of the parties. On the other hand, there is little evidence to date that
the act can or will be used to destroy the union movement. In terms
of specific content there is reason for criticism or question as to some
provisions and approbation as to others. Even the sponsors of the act
have conceded that some amendments are in order,75 and an.initial step
in this direction was taken with the enactment of the amendments to
the union shop provisions in 1951.76 A detailed examination of the
provisions of _the act is beyond the scope of our present discussion.

The Maturation of Collective Bargaining: Arbitration
To the practicing labor relations lawyer it is evident that the "law"
with which he must work consists not only of the legal principles
'13 See, for example, Petro, "Federal-State Relations in Labor Law," 1 LAB. L.J. 419
(1950); Petro, "State Jurisdiction to Control Recognition Picketing," 2 LAB. L.J. 3 (1951);
Petro, "State Jurisdiction to Regulate Violent Picketing," 3 LAB. L.J. 3 (1952); Cox and
Seidman, ''Federalism and Labor Relations," 64 HAnv. L. REv. 211 (1950); Smith, "The
Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations," 46 MrcH. L. REv. 593
(1948); and Benetar, "Jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board under the TaftHartley Act," Pnoc. OF N. Y. UNIV. TmRD ANNuAL CoNF. ON LABOR 277 (1950).
'14 The right to refrain from self-organization and concerted action is declared in section
7 of the amended NLRA. Section 8(c) of the amended NLRA is the so-called "free
speech" provision, pursuant to which employers (and unions) are free to resort to exhortation and propaganda so long as language of coercion is not used. The NLRB's Annual
Reports show, however, that more representation petitions have been filed per year since
the Taft-Hartley Act was passed than theretofore, on the average, and a continuing upward
trend is evident. Moreover, the post-LMRA percentages of union victory in representation elections has remained in the neighborhood of 80%, which is about the pre-LMRA
percentage.
'15 See the so-called "Taft substitute" for the Thomas-Lesinski bill (S. 249 and H.R.
2032), introduced in the 81st Congress.
'16 P.L. 189, 82d Cong., 1st sess.
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declared by statute and judicial decision, but also of the rules incorporated in collective bargaining agreements. These agreements,
although framed as though they were ordinary private contracts, actually operate in the plant as general standards or norms, much in the
manner of legislative acts. The individual employment agreement or
arrangement imports the terms of these contract standards very much
in the same way that negotiable instrument obligations take on content
from the N.I.L. There are now some 75,000 of these collective agreements, covering some 15,000,000 workers employed in American industry,77 including most of the basic or key industries. The terms of
employment laid down in these contracts have the most significant
implications not only to the parties immediately involved but to the
economy as a whole, and must be accorded a high, if not the highest,
position in the total body of legally enforceable labor relations rules.
Since the last two decades have seen the fullest flowering of collective
bargaining to date, it is proper to record this fact as a significant labor
law~development of the past half-century.
In the administration of these agreements a collateral development,
of particular interest to the labor relations lawyer, has _been the increasing use of voluntary arbitration as a means of amicable dispute
settlement. Governmenta1, policy has been solidly behind this movement, as shown by the creation of a statutory arbitration tribunal (the
National Railroad Adjustment Board) by the Railway Labor Act, the
sponsorship of grievance arbitration by the National War Labor Board
of World War II, the favorable though less specific pronouncements
written into the Taft-Hartley Act, and the encouragement and assistance given by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. Umpireships are now common under the basic collective agreements in
the steel, textile, aluminum, automotive, and other industries, and thoustands of arbitration decisions are handed down yearly by permanent
and ad hoc arbitrators. This body of decisions constitutes a rich source
of information concerning labor relations problems and principles, and,
while incompletely reported, is likely to develop into one of the most
important sources of practical labor relations law. 78 The widespread
use of arbitration is persuasive evidence of the increased sense of responsibility of labor and management and of the maturing of their
bargaining relationships.

,..

77DUNLoP,_ CoLU:CTIVE BARGAINING 14 (1949).
78 For an interesting and instructive account of arbitration

TRATION

WoRKs (1952).
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1286

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 50

Resume

What has been recited above shows clearly that the statement with
which this paper opened is accurate. Dramatic and almost revolutionary developments have, indeed, occurred during the past fifty years
in the body of labor law, using that term in the technical and traditional
sense. In the area of regulation of union-management-employee relations the most significant ·develop~ent has been the substitution of
legislative for judicial policy determination; as we have seen, we are
proceeding on the premise that suitable minimum standards of conduct
can and should be evolved by law. In the area of terms of. employment the· most significant developments have been the decision to £x
certain minimums by £at, through wage-hour, child labor; and social
security legislation, and the widespread use of collective bargaining,
through which standards are determined by negotiation; bargaining is
the great experiment in industrial democracy.
The standards of employment of today, in part legislative, in part bargained, in part still unilaterally determined by employers, are vastly d_ifferent in industry generally from those obtaining at or near the tum of
the century. The average earnings rate for factory workers advanced
from $0.19 per hour in 1909 to $1.086 per hour in 1946.79 From 1900
to 1946, while the cost of living index (1914-100) advanced from
75 to 194, tlie index of average hourly earnings increased from 76
to 486, which means that the increase in the real earnings rate was
151 ·per cent.80 There was some collective bargaining even befo~e
1900,81 but the bulk of present day contract standards; including
seniority protection, premium pay, vacation and holiday provisions,
pension and insurance plans, and grievance machinery, are the product
of the efforts of the past fifty years.
There is a question, of course, to what extent this progress in the
earnings rate can be attributed to the trade union movemeµt. Reputable
economic authority may be cited in support of the proposition that, for
1 the worker population as a whole, increases in real income would have
been forthcoming to substantially the same degree with or without
unionism, in view of technological progress in this country. Be that as
it may, there can be no doubt that other important work standards of
79 BLS, HANDBOOK oF I.Allon STATisncs 59 (1950).
so BLooM AND NORTHRUP, EcoNoMics oF I.Allon AND hrousTRIAL RELATIONS 67

(1950).
81 See

CHAMBERLAIN, CoLLBCTIVB BARGAINING,

c. 2 (1951).
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today, not the least of which are the very important intangible values
to the worker accruing in the very process of collective bargaining, including grievance handling, owe their existence to unionism.

What of the Future?
American labor law during the past 6.fty years has accommodated
itself to the trade union movement, then protected and fostered it, and
finally taken account of and sought to control and regulate the use of
its· vast economic power. "Labor relations" experts who look at
union-management-employee problems in terms of "human relations"
are inclined to doubt both the wisdom and the necessity of this "approach
through law." Certainly this point of view must receive serious consideration, especially by those who administer the collective bargaining relationship, for the existence of legal standards even in their present complex
form is designed to mark the outer boundaries of conduct rather than to
provide the guide-posts for good relations between the parties. But the student of American law is likely, with justification, to believe that, barring a
consolidation of union political power such as to make legal restrictions
upon unions untenable, there will be no substantial recession from the
currently held view that the relations growing out of unionism should
be subjected to minimum legal standards.
This is not to suggest the absence of very serious problems in the
6.eld of labor law. Assuming the desirability, or at least the inevitability,
of a continuance of the policy of legal controls, the shape of the law
remains a matter of vital concern. Certain questions of paramount
importance may be noted. The 6.rst relates to the fundamental problem of union, or union-employer, economic power. Both the TaftHartley Act and the Railway Labor Act leave the parties to collective
bargaining substantially free to make such bargains as they will, and,
in pursuit of their respective positions, to use their economic power
freely except when a "national emergency" strike or lockout situation
develops, and except, in the case of the Taft-Hartley Act, that unions
are forbidden to use the secondary boycott.
The underlying premise is that "free" collective bargaining produces results compatible on the whole with the public interest, or at
least that the risks involved are less than those that would attend any
effort on the part of the state to interfere with the bargaining process
beyond insistence upon "good faith."_ If, as must be assumed, it was
intended on the whole to preserve freedom to make bargains in terms
of the resultant of relative economic strength, one may ,:i.ronder a little
whether the complete prohibition of the use of the secondary boycott
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is sound, for this tactic would seem to be less potent in the aggregate than the primary strike (e.g., in the basic industries) as a means of
union coercion. Our economy is no longer, if it ever was, characterized
by the kind of atomistic enterprise and organization in which the forces of
free competition can, in the name of Adam Smith, be relied upon to
maximize production ·at minimum prices. We have instead massive
concentrations of capital under single ownership, now matched by corresponding union power. We have "monopolistic competition" among
and within industries along with monopolistic control by unions of the
labor force. We have "pattern" and in some important instances industry-wide bargaining. Economists are struggling to determine
whether this type of economic organization can be relied upon to produce results consistent with the public interest, and, if not, what to do
about it. 82 The problem presented is exceedingly complex and difficult.
It seems quite clear, at least to this observer, that we shall not in any case
attempt to solve the problem by atomizing either industrial or labor organizations; but the question remains whether any move should be made in
the direction of supplying and applying economic standards against
which to test the conduct of big business and big labor. I venture no
opinion on this point, for I think economic analysis has not as yet
reached the point where a considered judgment can be rendered. I
do suggest, however, that the shape of our labor law must necessarily
be involved in the solution which is ultimately sought.
A second· problem, somewhat collateral to the first, concerns the
official policy to be applied with respect to the "national emergency"
strike or lockout. Present statutory policy, laying aside the special
treatment provided through the Wage Stabilization Board, calls for the
use of the "cooling off" technique backed up by injunction and implemented by public fact finding under the Taft-Hartley Act or public
recommendations under the Railway Labor Act. These procedures
have not been notably successful in recent years, and we shall continue
to face the question whether alternative solutions should be attempted.
82 For general examinations of the problem see BtJRNs, THE DBcLIN:B oF CoMPEnTION
(1936); CHAMBERLIN, THBoRY oF MoNOPOLISTIC CoMPEnTION, 6th ed., (1950); CLARX,
ALTERNATIVE TO SERPDOM (1948); SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DBMOC·
RACY, 3rd ed., (1950); GRIFFIN, Em-mu>msE IN A FREE SOCIETY (1949); and STOCKING
AND WATKINS, MoNOPOLY AND FREE ENTmu>msE (1951). For discussions of the union
problem see Simons, "Some Rcllections on Syndicalism," 52 J. PoL. EcoN. 1 (1944); Ross,
TRADE UNION WAGE POLICY (1948); UNDBLOM, UNIONS AND CAPITALISM (1949);
RBYNoLDs, LA.Bon EcoNoMics AND LA.Bon RBLA';rIONS, Part Two (1949); SucBTER,
MonERN EcoNoMic SOCIETY, cc. XXIII-XXV (1936); BLOOM AND NonnmuP, EcoNoMics
oF LA.Bon AND !NnuSTRIAL RELATIONS, Part IV (1950); and CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING, cc. 15-17 (1951).
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There is a growing feeling, for example, that compulsory arbitration
should be tried, at least in the case of railroads. Many observers hold
that Taft-Hartley emergency boards of inquiry should have power to
make recommendations on the issues in dispute in the particular case
in order better to crystallize and focus public pressure on the parties.
There is even support among some neutral critics for the view that the
emergency problem has been magnified out of all proportion to the
fa~ts and that a general policy of non-intervention should be adopted.
The importance of this question lies not simply in the point that a
given dispute may involve, if carried to the point of strike or lockout,
serious and even catastrophic immediate repercussions. Of at least
equal importance is the fact that the terms ultimately agreed upon
usually have the most serious general economic effects. If the state
is to intervene on any basis which tends to affect these terms, the responsibility is great. Here also, then, we have a continuing problem of
absorbing interest, magnified by the recent decision in the Steel seizure
cases.
Finally, as an item· for the future, note may ·be taken of the perplexities arising in the matter of determining legal relations within the
union structure. These relations are both intra and inter union, and
include such matters as the standards, if any, to be met by union membership rules as well as the machinery for their internal enforcement,
the question whether, and if so by what means, "democracy" shall be
required within unions, what legal relationships shall exist between
parent and local unions, and how to resolve inter-union representation
and jurisdictional disputes. Thus far, for the most part, the development of legal policy with respect to intra-union matters has been left to
the law of unincorporated associations, which means that judicial intervention on the whole has been limited to the enforcement of the basic
"contracts" (constitutions and by-laws) of the unions. A slight deviation from this pattern is observable in the attention paid to union membership regulations by the enactment in a few states of FEPC legislation, in Taft-Hartley's oblique attack on the problem by the method'
of laying down certain prerequisites for the validation of the union
shop, and in the work of the courts in holding unions to the standardsof fiduciaries in exercising their bargaining responsibilities. The most
forthright legislative action has been in relation to inter-union conHicts and consists of the labor relations act provisions for the resolution.
of representation and jurisdictional disputes. Especially in regard to the·
p!Oblem of internal union relations, however, the law is still embryonic,.
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and yet it is increasingly apparent that the manner in which unions
operate with respect to their existing and potential mem~ership is a
matter of tremendous importance in view of the position ri.8w held by
the unions as the representatives of workers. Most progressive union
leaders are fully cognizant of this fact and are seeking the development
of fair operating standards. Much progress along this line is to be noted,
especially among the CIO unions. The question facing lawmakers is
whether and to what degree there should be evolved with respect to
· these problems a code of law.

